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ABSTRACT 
 
The notion of a European constitution is highly divisive, and has been intensely debated 
for several decades now. Following the 2005 failure to ratify a proposed European 
Constitutional treaty document, the text of a ‘Reform Treaty’ has been agreed upon.  The 
Reform Treaty will be submitted to the European leaders on 13 December 2007, after 
which each member state of the Union will have to ratify it. European constitutional 
issues and debates thus remain highly topical. This article analyses the main arguments 
for and against a codified European constitutional document, and concludes that at this 
moment in time the prospect of an EU constitution would create more problems than it 
could rectify.  
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DOES EUROPE NEED A CONSTITUTION? 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of a European constitution is highly divisive, and has been intensely debated for several decades 
now. After efforts during the 1980s and 1990s foundered,i calls for an EEC/EU constitution intensified with the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the looming Eastern enlargement. It is generally agreed that the most recent 
constitutional debate was sparked by a speech delivered on 12 May 2000 at the Humboldt University in Berlin. 
Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, spoke in a private capacity in the debate on the future of the 
European Union, proposing a constitutional treaty be concluded. In 2002 the Laeken Declaration was released, 
posing fifty questions on the proposed development of the European Union. The Declaration was followed up 
by the 2002 launch of the Convention on the Future of Europe, and in 2003 an Inter-Governmental Conference 
draft treaty was approved. However, in 2005 the draft treaty was rejected by national referenda held in France 
and the Netherlands. A period of reflection followed and it now appears likely that a revised draft known as the 
Reform Treaty will be approved. There are important arguments both for and against the need for a European 
constitution. Arguments against reason variously that Europe already has an uncodified constitution, that the 
issue is too divisive and would entrench unwanted reform, and that the EU does not possess the necessary 
prerequisites - such as a homogenous demos – to install a constitution. Arguments for a constitution include the 
notion of constitutional patriotism, an argument for greater clarification of and identification with a European 
telos, and the need for institutional reform. There is perhaps the temptation to see a European constitution as a 
universal panacea for all the problems of a European Union under siege. Ultimately this paper will conclude that 
the divisive nature of a constitution in the European Union today obscures the relative usefulness of the notion. 
Instead, it would perhaps be more useful to progress with treaty streamlining and continued public debate until 
such time as popular support is more firmly behind the notion of a European Constitution.  
 
DEFINITION 
 
‘A constitution is the fountain head from which other laws flow and derive validity.’ii Constitutions are found in 
many different forms, and fulfil various functions. The precise nature of the term changes dependent on the 
time, place and the nature of the organism it is being applied to. A constitution may be the founding text of a 
State. It may be written or unwritten,iii rigid or flexible, normative or merely descriptive.iv However as Dehousse 
and Coussens point out, a constitution can also be the founding text of an international organisation: 
‘Revealingly, the Universal Postal Union… has a Constitution. The International Labour Organisation is another 
example.’v  Belllamy & Schoenlau take a prescriptive stance, stating that ‘a constitution both establishes a 
polity, defining who the people subject to it are and within which functional and territorial spheres, and creates a 
form of regime’.vi The typical content of a constitution can also vary. Essentially it describes how a state is 
constituted and functions.vii  ‘A common argument in political science is that constitutions are created to solve 
collective action problems.’ viii Thus, Ziller highlights Article 16 of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et 
du Citoyen of 26 August 1789: ‘Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n’est pas assurée ni la 
séparation des pouvoirs déterminée n’a point de Constitution’. For Ziller the common action problems of 
society are the organisation of the relationship between the state and citizen, and the establishment of checks 
and balances between institutions.ix Føllesdal agrees with this statement, and defines the four functions of a 
constitution as follows: 
 
A constitution creates new institutions or codifies existing institutions with 
specified  competences in the form of bundles of legal powers. It curbs such 
 power….by securing human rights and other legal immunities and powers,  
and by dividing political authority among several institutions. A constitution  
may also [indicate] the goals to be pursued, typically… stated in preambles.  
Fourthly, a constitution contains rules for constitutional change.x  
 
Here the idea emerges of a constitution as the founding document/s of an organisation, typically concerned with 
the organisation and allocation of power between les gouvernants and les gouvernés.  
 
In any conceptual definition of ‘constitution’, it is important to appreciate from where an individual constitution 
gains its authority. A constitution does not anchor a society’s legal system by virtue of name alone. It must draw 
its authority from somewhere.xi In the case of an international organisation, constitutional authority is usually 
conferred via member-state ratification of the founding treaty. In regards to a democratic nation-state ‘it is 
generally agreed that…whatever the nature of the constitution, its authority flows from the people of the 
polity.’xii At the time of the French Revolution, Thomas Paine elucidated more clearly that, ‘A constitution is 
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not the act of a Government, but of a people constituting a Government, and a Government without a 
constitution is power without right… A constitution is a thing antecedent to a Government; and a Government is 
only the creation of a constitution.’xiii 
 
Thus in a typical democratic nation-state of Western Europe, the constitutional rules gain their legitimacy from 
the polity. This seemingly benign point enjoys great prominence in the European constitutional debate and will 
be revisited at a later point. 
 
PRE-EXISTING ORGANIC CONSTITUTION? 
 
In assessing the need for a European constitution, it is important to consider to what extent one already exists. 
Weiler makes a convincing argument: there is general agreement in legal circles that an uncodified, organic 
constitution has been established through integration.xiv  More precisely, constitutive rules can be found in a 
variety of documents, as opposed to a single, overarching, codified document. In 1986, the European Court of 
Justice delivered a landmark decision, Les Verts, which described the founding treaties of the EEC as a 
‘constitutional charter’.xv Then in 1991 in its Opinion of the EEA Agreement, the Court said:  
 
 The EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international  
 agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional charter of a  
 Community based on the rule of law. As the Court of Justice has  
 consistently held, the Community treaties established a new legal  
 order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign 
  rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not  
 only Member States but also their nationals.xvi 
 
Crucially, it is possible to distil certain fundamental constitutional principles from the European treaties. The 
most important of these principles are the twin notions of the supremacy of community law and its direct effect 
on the member-states.xvii A further fundamental principle is that of pre-emption by community law, so that when 
the EU moves to act in an area, member states lose their ability to act in that area henceforth.xviii Further 
identifiable constitutional rights include a right to effective legal protection,xix and a catalogue of fundamental 
rights upheld as part of the general principles of law whose observance the European Court of Justice ensures.xx 
Returning to the definitions of a constitution offered above, it seems that the unwritten European constitution 
fulfils at least partly Føllesdal’s constitutional criteria.xxi It creates institutions with specified competences; it, 
partially, curbs such power; and it contains some rules for treaty reform. There are also indications, to an extent, 
of some of the goals to be pursued by the Union.xxii     
 
Concerning the significance of an uncodified constitution in the larger constitutional debate, in a key speech 
given in 2000 British Prime Minister Tony Blair commented:  
 
In practice I suspect that, given the sheer diversity and complexity  
 of the EU, its constitution, like the British constitution, will continue to be 
 found in a number of different treaties, laws and precedents. …  
A constitutional debate must not necessarily end with a single, legally 
binding document called a Constitution for an entity as dynamic as  
the EU.xxiii 
 
In the same speech however, Blair went on to call for a ‘statement of principles’ via a political document 
forming a charter of competences.xxiv This suggestion aptly highlights a key criticism levelled at the ‘unwritten 
constitution’ school: that an unwritten constitution is too amorphous, inaccessible and unwieldy, especially in an 
enlarged EU of 27 member-states.xxv As the 2001 Laeken Declaration pointed out: ‘The European Union 
currently has four Treaties. The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are spread across those 
Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.’xxvi Critics argue that even if the EU 
is underpinned by various constitutional principles, it would benefit greatly from clearer definition of power 
sharing and organisational structure. It is here that a written European constitution would be of great benefit. 
 
Following on from this criticism of an unwritten European constitution, Grimm does point out that, ‘legal 
binding of the public power exercised by the [EU] is not lacking.’xxvii However, he is uncertain that this existing 
legal binding is sufficient.xxviii Building on this contention Vaubel notes that the existing treaties ‘do not 
constrain the power of the European institutions in an effective, democratic and incentive-compatible way.’xxix 
More precisely, by examining the main EU organs,xxx Vaubel argues that the present constituting treaties of the 
EU violate firstly the principle of the separation of powers, secondly the democratic principle and thirdly the 
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principle of subsidiarity.xxxi These arguments concerning the institutional deficiencies of the current European 
Union are accepted by a significant number of commentators.xxxii Thus critics argue that an unwritten 
constitution is not sufficient to govern such a large and complex organisation as the EU, and that a written 
constitution would be more appropriate.xxxiii There is therefore a tendency to view a written European 
Constitution as an opportunity to reform the EU, and to bring it into line with liberal democratic principles on 
the organisation of governmental power. A further issue for some writers is that uncodified constitutional 
principles enjoy no special pre-eminence over other bodies of law, and have no status of unrepealability. Some 
argue that this is cause for concern, and that important constitutional principles must be entrenched in order to 
safeguard them properly. xxxiv These are all significant criticisms, suggesting that further analysis of whether 
Europe needs a (codified) constitution should be undertaken.  
 
OPPORTUNITY FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM? 
 
In light of the inherent difficulties in operating under an unwritten constitution, a pressing argument for a 
European constitution has centred on the need for EU reform. There is broad agreement that the EU in its 
current form designed primarily for 12 member states,xxxv is suffering under the strain of 27 member states. 
Structural problems have emerged from an asymmetry between dense horizontal market integration and looser 
vertical political integration of individualist national governments, compounded by ‘a corresponding deficit in 
the democratic legitimation of EU decisions’.xxxvi Increasingly, an EU constitution has been seen as an 
appropriate medium for reform.xxxvii There is growing awareness that successive treaties in Maastricht (1992), 
Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (1999) had failed to properly address institutional reform and that further 
clarification is required.xxxviii  As President of the 2003 Convention on the Future of Europe and former 
President of France, Valery Giscard d’Estaing identified key areas where reform were needed, in line with the 
Laeken Declaration objectives of 2001.xxxix In particular, d’Estaing highlighted the need for simplification of EU 
instruments, the Commission crises of the 1990s and the difficulties of reaching consensus in an enlarged EU, 
the democratic deficitxl and the need to improve the perceived accessibility of citizens to the EU as well as the 
need for a clarification of institutional structure and the division of competencies and, finally, the issue of a 
common foreign policy.xli  
 
Whilst there has been general consensus on the need for reform, debate on what type of reform can be separated 
into two broad camps: the supranationalist approach, and the federalist approach. ‘In addition, national and 
ideological differences cut across this divide.’xlii Supranationalists campaign for the creation of a true European 
polity, and the creation of a European superstate. In line with this ambition, a constitution is seen as having the 
potential to cement the notion of Europe as a supranational order and contribute to the success of the 
supranational vision.xliii On the other hand, those in the opposing federalist camp advocate a vision of the EU as 
a ‘Federation of Nation States'. Federalists are often more cautious about a European constitution. They 
recognise that reform via the implementation of a constitution will bring about greater surety and stability. 
However, constantly on guard against measures aimed at superseding the nation-state, federalists warn that the 
constitution must entrench the individual power and identity of member-states.  
 
Therefore reformists argue for a constitution on the basis that it will help implement various goals and, crucially, 
help to legitimise the EU by reducing the democratic deficit. However, the obvious answer to reformists of 
either ilk is that treaty reform can be carried out without recourse to a European constitution.  Treaty-creation 
and subsequent modification and reform have been features of the EEC/EU since its inception.  By itself, the 
need for reform is insufficient justification for a European constitutional document. As Skach points out, there 
are fundamental problems with the reform argument. The first issue revolves around assertions that a formal 
constitution will help solve the EU legitimacy deficit. ‘There is simply no comparative historical evidence that 
this is indeed how one builds legitimacy – through a written constitution.’xliv On the other hand, there are well-
established democratic and legitimate states such as the UK, New Zealand and Israel who operate without a 
codified constitution. A constitution per se is not a legitimising force. It must be accompanied by judicial 
backing and a strong sense of popular support in order to help overcome the perceived democratic deficit. Those 
who argue for reform via a constitution however, assert that it is the provisions contained within the document 
which will help enshrine legitimacy. And it is here that a second problem emerges. ‘If the crafting of a formal, 
written constitution is seen as an opportunity to clarify all rules, and if this involves trying to produce a very 
detailed rigid document, pinning down exact concerns and even negotiating immediate political conflicts, then 
such a constitution may actually work against the goal of setting up a stable, effective system for governing.’xlv 
 
The contentious issue of religion within the failed Constitutional Treaty provides an apt example of a 
destabilising issue within the constitutional process. Furthermore, the negotiating and compromising process 
may result in the codification of unpopular measures, which could cause possible future resentment and further 
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destabilise the EU. As Chambers points out, a far less destabilising approach would be an evolutionary one, 
whereby the constitution is seen as: ‘a model of agreement based on maintaining a conversation over time rather 
than concluding a contract’.xlvi This approach resonates well with Blair’s proposed ‘Statement of Principles’ 
discussed above. On the whole, it is apparent the EU needs legislation reform in order to cope with enlargement 
strains. Yet from a technical point of view it is not so apparent that a reform via a constitution is the best 
solution. However, the debate over a European constitution encompasses more than the issue of reform.  
 
A EUROPEAN TELOS 
 
A related but distinct argument for a European constitution centres on the need for redefinition of a European 
telos and vision for the integration project. As Dobson & Follesdal point out, ‘Sharper definition of the EU in its 
international environment [demands] greater unity of purpose within the EU. It also [requires] more public 
legitimacy and support than the effective performance of bureaucrats and technocrats in the duller reaches of 
economic policy could provide.’xlvii The assumption behind the telos argument is that the process of adopting a 
constitution would generate public debate and eventual agreement on an overall vision for Europe. This view 
reiterates the notion that the development thus far of EU constitutional rules has lacked public input and debate. 
Thus Weiler talks of a constitution without constitutionalism, and argues that, ‘What Europe needs…is not a 
constitution but an ethos and telos to justify the constitutionalism it has already embraced.’xlviii Eriksen & 
Fossum are in accord when they argue that, ‘the EU has developed a set of binding norms and rules but their 
principled and practical status is unclear and incomplete. They have not been properly debated’.xlix There is a 
clear hope that a written constitution would provide direction by urging the EU towards a common goal agreed 
upon by public consensus. The symbolic institution of a constitution could assist in both formulating and 
enshrining a sense of common destiny within the European peoples. This is a similar argument to the notion of 
constitutional patriotism addressed below. 
 
THE NO DEMOS THEORY 
 
It is important to recognise however that there are those who argue vehemently that Europe does not need a 
constitution. A highly controversial dispute within the debate rages over the so called ‘No Demos’ theory. The 
No Demos theory argues that a European constitution is inappropriate for Europe, on the basis that Europe lacks 
a cohesive, unitary demos with the power to legitimise a constitution.l The No Demos theory is underpinned by 
the fear that a European Constitution would entrench Europe as a superstate.li In turn, this notion is based on the 
argument that a constitution is a formative or constitutive feature of the nation-state: ‘Constitutions form the 
basis of states. Supranational institutions, by contrast, have their legal basis in constitutional treaties.’lii At 
present the EU is anchored by a complex system of international treaties, which draw legal authority for the 
legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.liii However, within a state, the legitimacy for the constitution is drawn 
from the people.liv This is the basic tenet of Western liberal democratic nations. It is therefore possible to argue 
that within this ideological framework, democracy is the only acceptable method of legitimating a constitution. 
However, as Weiler summarises: ‘Democracy does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the existence of a 
polity with members – the Demos – by whom and for whom democratic discourse with its many variants take 
place.’lv It is only within the political boundaries of the Demos that a majority has the authority and legitimacy 
to compel a minority. Therefore, without a Demos there can be no operating democracy.lvi  The argument runs 
that if Europe had a constitution, its authority would then stem from the constitution, and no longer be drawn 
from principles of international law. At this point, it would need to be legitimated by a majority of the governed 
populus, in order to align with the democratic principles underpinning the European Union. Thus to be 
legitimate, any European constitution would have to draw its power from the people of the EU. The main 
contention of the No Demos theory however is that there is no single European demos capable of giving 
authorised majoritarian approval, and that therefore there can be no legitimate European constitution. From this 
logic is drawn the (perhaps slightly hysterical) conclusion that a constitution that is not empowered via the 
people is illegitimate and verges on the despotic.lvii 
 
The lack of a European demos is asserted through empirical observance. ‘Demos’ is employed here in the 
nation-based or ethnic conception of the term.lviii Objectively, a pan-European organic homogeneity, on which 
the subjective elements of the demos are constructed, is lacking. The subjective elements of the demos include a 
sense of shared collective identity and loyalty based on a common culture and historical view,lix generally 
equating to the German notion of the Volk.lx The theory does not accept that the last fifty-odd years of peace, 
economic unity and increasing social intercourse can be substituted for the traditional bonds of the demos. As 
Weiler points out, there are two serious implications resulting from this view. The first is that sans pan-
European Demos, there can be no pan-European democracy. The second, Weiler contends, is that the theory is 
not simply an empirical observation on the lack of European demos. Rather, it is a normative prescription that 
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precludes even a possible future European demos. Thus for the No Demos school, the telos of European 
integration is, ‘…an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’lxi It is not about creating a homogenous, 
pan-European body, ‘a European nation or people.’lxii This is an argument against a European constitution on 
two grounds. The first is a technical argument that there lacks a legitimate structural basis on which to found a 
constitution. The second argument is normative, and asserts that in the interests of preserving individual nation-
state identities, a constitution and the ‘suprastate’, which would ‘inevitably’ result from the constitution, is 
undesirable. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
 
However, there are strong rejoinders to the No Demos argument arguing for a European constitution. The main 
riposte is founded on the concept of constitutional patriotism. Despite the arguments of the No Demos theory, 
the establishment of a European identity has long been considered essential to prevent Europe re-fragmenting 
into religious, ethnic and national splinters. lxiii  For this reason commentators such as German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas consider that for the EU to remain a stable, lasting political community, it is essential that 
citizens identify with the organisation.lxiv  As the No Demos theory accurately points out, European identity 
politics thus far have enjoyed limited success.lxv Constitutional patriotism argues that it is for this reason that a 
written European constitution is necessary, in order ‘to bring citizens closer to the European design and 
European Institutions.’lxvi Habermas thus proposes that a European constitution be founded on civic patriotism. 
He emphasises the distinction between citizenship and ‘a community of fate shaped by common descent, 
language and history’,lxvii and argues that the fundamental mistake within the No Demos theory is its failure to 
make this distinction. Habermas’ argument for a European constitution is founded on this precept. 
 
There is a long intellectual tradition of distinguishing between civic and ethnic membership of a community.lxviii 
Post-World War Two, the theme has been taken up by liberal philosopher Karl Jasperslxix and by Jaspers’ pupil, 
the German Dolf Sternberger. More recently it has been examined by thinkers such Habermas, Müller and 
Weiler. Briefly, the term ‘nation-state’ as generally understood in Western Europe is a conglomeration of nation 
– ethnic culture – with state – as republican sovereignty. Yet for Habermas, ‘A nation of citizens must not be 
confused with a community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history.’lxx In the English-
speaking world, this concept is often confused under the catch-all term ‘citizenship’, a factor which has been 
exploited by the No Demos argument with its criticism of the Maastricht innovation of European citizenship.lxxi 
A more precise expression is found in the French language, which makes a distinction between citoyenneté 
referring to membership of a political community, and nationalité, which is the legal status linking an individual 
to the state.lxxii The No Demos argument tends to fuse these two notions of ethnic-culture and political 
citizenship, as is traditional under the classic Westphalian model of the nation-state. However, Habermas argues 
that nationalism is in fact a specific and deliberate constructlxxiii that has been utilised by politics and various 
interest groups. It has been the exploitation of constructed nationality that has allowed the imposition of cultural 
and ethnic homogeneity within states and the creation of European national demoi. Thus for Habermas, 
nationalism provides empirical evidence that a ‘community of strangers’ can be consciously created. This is in 
contrast to the No Demos school, which asserts that nationalism is an organic, irreplicable process. 
 
Habermas’ own work rejects the traditional No Demos conception of organic cultural-ethnic citizenship,lxxiv and 
differentiates between a common political culture and a plurality of national traditions and historiography. The 
philosopher argues that the concept of citizenship is based on republican ideals, in which the state is founded by 
the praxis of citizens actively exercising their civil rights.lxxv Applying this in the European context, 
constitutional patriotism rests upon three central tenets: the ethos of the post-war welfare state, the universality 
of human rights and the constitutional principles of sovereign democracy. Habermas also emphasises that recent 
history also plays a significant role in creating a shared European culture. ‘What forms the common core of a 
European identity is the character of the painful learning process it has gone through…It is the lasting memory 
of nationalist excess and moral abyss that lends to our present commitments the quality of a peculiar 
achievement.’lxxvi 
 
Constitutional patriotism asserts that European individuals across the continent will join in legitimation of these 
shared values, stimulated by the institution of a European constitution. Allegiance to this common political 
culture will form the basis for a more meaningful European citizenship. Habermas puts forward Switzerland and 
Belgium as examples of functioning multi-nation states, to show that political citizenship does not rely on the 
traditional one-nation, one-state conception. He then extrapolates from these examples to argue that in fact there 
can be a, ‘common, supranationally shared political culture of the European Community’ under the auspices of a 
European constitution.lxxvii  
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Essentially, Habermas conceives of a European constitution and constitutional patriotism theory as a solution to 
ethnic-nationalist division within the European Union. A Constitution would signify European consensus, and 
be the ‘symbolic crystallisation of a political act of foundation’.lxxviii Although Habermas considers the 
fundamental prerequisites for a pan-Europe civic culture to be in place, he feels that a constitution is needed to 
prevent the EU degenerating into a loose economic alliance: ‘A European constitution would not only make 
manifest the shift in powers that has already taken place. It would also release and foster further shifts.’lxxix 
Habermas envisions that the constitution will combat asymmetry between economic and political integration in 
the EU, and the corresponding democratic deficit.lxxx The intellectual elites and mass media are required under 
the model to help create a common public sphere to foster a shared political community.lxxxi This process will 
then help contribute to a sense of ‘European constitutional patriotism [which] would grow out of different 
interpretations of the same universalist rights and constitutional principles’.lxxxii Thus constitutional patriotism 
reiterates the argument that a European Constitution is needed to enhance reform, and argues further that a 
Constitution would stimulate a European telos and community spirit. Constitutional patriotism justifies the need 
for a European constitution as part of a unifying vision for the new, integrated Europe. 
 
As Müller points out however, a major criticism at this point is that a European constitution and the notion of 
constitutional patriotism generally are too abstract to command the hearts and minds of citizens.lxxxiii Modern 
procedural liberalism has no room for the strong passions of belonging, loyalty, and allegiance, and so it cannot 
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires.lxxxiv Ultimately, this is an argument that can 
only be resolved by empirical evidence over time. A second important criticism Müller makes is that 
Habermasian constitutional patriotism underestimates the role of particularist political cultures in grounding 
universalistic principles of democracy and justice.lxxxv Furthermore, critics argue that Habermas and his 
predecessors draw upon a common Germanic post-war culture in which stridently ethnic conceptions of 
nationality are considered taboo. The post-war German nation prefers instead to privilege a civic conception of 
political community, underpinned by the rule of law. Thus Müller argues that constitutional patriotism applies 
best to the specific historical circumstances of Germany, and is less convincing as justification for a European 
constitution. However, whilst it is important to recognise the circumstances that gave birth to the theory, there is 
still objective merit in Habermas’ concept of a community artificially constructed in order to pursue certain 
goals and ideals. It is the underlying theory - that it is possible to construct a pan-European demos - that best 
justifies the need for a European constitution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Inevitably, any organisation which comes together with a common purpose, or a series of common purposes, 
will tend to create a formal, political structure by which those purposes may be achieved and a general system 
according to which the members of the organisation agree to be governed.lxxxvi This process of creation is 
evident within the EU of the past and the present and there exists already ‘the embryo of a European 
Constitution’.lxxxvii  Perhaps the most relevant observatilxxxviii on for the purposes of this article is to note that the 
enlarged EU of 27 member-states operates today without a formally codified constitution. As McGiffen 
observed prior to the 2005 constitutional referenda failures: ‘…in the short term the inability to agree a 
Constitution would have no profound consequences, especially as most of the more far reaching changes would 
have been implemented only after a considerable delay’.lxxxix Thus cynics see the constitutional debate as a 
largely rhetorical exercise which consolidates but does not surpass the achievements of recent intergovernmental 
conferences or fundamentally change the nature of the EU.xc Some deny even the basic infrastructure of a demos 
necessary to implement a constitution. Idealists such as Habermas view it as offering the potential for a new 
departure that replaces intergovernmental bargaining with deliberation to produce a genuine European 
consensus.xci As previously observed, there is a tendency to herald a European constitution as a universal 
panacea, envisaging it as a catalyst engineered to stimulate flagging Eurobarometer polls and to revitalise the 
collective project of Europe. Perhaps a more realistic method of achieving these goals however is further treaty 
reform, and potentially a basic Charter of Principles à la Blair, accompanied by serious attempts to stimulate 
pan-European discourse and to engage the populace at large. These measures might prove more successful than 
the divisive and potentially politically destabilising institution of a European constitution. Whilst formal 
codification of Europe’s constitution may be appropriate in a future political climate, it is difficult to argue that 
it is the best course forward at this point in Europe’s evolution.  
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